Myrtus

What about Derja?

One of my favorite English language Algerian bloggers, Lameen Souag has mentioned something that I have believed to be most pressing for some time. This is the issue of Derja, the Algerian vernacular Arabic dialect. Derja is often dismissed by many Algerians and their leaders as "baby talk" or simply bad Arabic. I have heard from some (my cousin Saleem) that the dialect is the "Bastard child of French rape" and that it should not be encouraged because it undermines Arabic. Derja is a mixture of Arabic, French, various Berber dialects, and in some areas Landino, Spanish, Italian or Maltese. It is as varied as is Algeria’s history and as rich as its landscape. Yet it is not taught in Algerian schools whilst Arabic and French are. The beginnings of Thamazight language education are taking root in places like Batna and Kabylia. Yet the language that is common to so many Algerians, and is usually the first language learned verbally, is denied its proper role in education, literature and more broadly life.

The issue discussed by Lameen at his linguistics blog "Jabal al-Lughat" is that of creating a body of Derja literature. This, Lameen argues (along with Moroccan blogger Laila Lalami), would allow Algerian youths to learn to read and write at an earlier age. As Lalami puts it (you may know her as Moorish Girl)

I'm fully in favor of using Darija, because of the huge impact it would have on the creation of a reading culture. Imagine: All children's books right now are in Modern Standard Arabic, which is a language no one learns until first grade (i.e. age 6 or 7), by which time reading habits are already in place for many kids.

Derja literature would help Algerian kids to appreciate reading at an earlier age because it would not so foreign. Foreign because Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is not usually mutually intelligible with many North African dialects and as Lalami notes, is not formally learned, for the most part, until students enter school. Since MSA is the language of instruction only when students get into school, it functions not as a "natural" language, but really in a way similar to any other foreign language. If MSA were the language that Algerians spoke at home, it would be somewhat different, but the fact that MSA is not a "real" language (it was constructed out of conferences in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus in order to save the Arabic language from becoming a dead tongue) complicates matters to the fullest. Derja literature would simplify matters, because as different as Derja is from MSA, they are still closely related and the introduction of children’s books in Derja, written in the Arabic script, would aid youths in learning Arabic in school.

But I would not stop there. I would favor the institutionalization of Derja as a valid language, an "Algerian" language as it were. I have nothing against Arabic, but I think that Derja would do several things to enhance the Algerian experience. For instance, I think that many Algerians suffer from an identity crisis as it were when it comes to linguistic and national matters. Many Algerians sadly deny their own national culture for that of some abstract "Arab nation," with whom they are not able to communicate with without a great degree of effort. Things that make Algeria what it is, its eclectic dialect, its semi-pagan mountain rituals, its wonderful dishes, are all too often looked upon with disdain by some Algerians, especially those with more "Arabist" leanings. Algerian Arabs have a proud history, but all too often they are not raised to be proud of it. Still other Algerians are over xenophilic, obsessed with all that is anything but themselves. Some are fascinated, as many Arabs are, with Andalusia, with Iberia. In the US, many Algerian expatriates, quite sadly, pass themselves off as being "Spanish" or "Latin" in their origins. These Algerians have counter parts back home who immerse themselves in the culture of Iberia while rejecting or forgetting their own. Some Algerians, often Imazighen or wealthy, find themselves admiring France more than their own country. Looking across the Mediterranean and wishing that they were not surrounded by sickly Arabs, but "civilized" Frenchmen and Europeans, trying to wish away the "curse" of Islam and all that came with it. There is a lack of confidence among Algerians. Is not the Algerian culture worth admiration and propagation? Why must Algerians conform to a linguistic tradition that is not theirs? Perhaps this model of thought fits Egypt or Syria, but Algeria is not those. Arabic has its place in Algerian history, culture, and religion but today Derja is far more widespread than is Arabic. Derja should be taught alongside Arabic in a mandatory fashion for at least a few years of schooling.

Lameen also mentions the issue of foreign language education in Algeria, which is sadly dominated by French. His sentiments regarding this topic are nearly identical to my own. French is not a bad language, but it has a retarding effect on the prospects that Algerian students have in the world. I believe that English is probably the most useful foreign language that one can learn today. French deems one to, as Lameen puts it, the "ghetto of Fracophony". Many people even in the French speaking world know English, as do those in most of Europe, many parts of the Middle East, Africa, East Asia and even Latin America. As Lameen states, students should

From 3rd grade on, have a choice between French and English(and maybe even Spanish) as the second language, and raise a generation of educated North Africans that do not all share a single foreign language; only thus can the domination of French in North Africa, with all its attendant sociological divisions and economic problems, be ended.

I think the statistic is that of secondary school students in Algeria, upwards from 98% of students take French as their foreign language. Only something like 9,000 students take English. French used to be the first language of diplomacy, now it is at best the second. Algeria should get on the forefront by encouraging students to take English.

Pugnarum Sententiarum

[This is an article that I wrote for my school newspaper's end of the year issue about our debate team's success this year. Originally posted here.]

It was a rainy April Saturday in Darien, Connecticut. A chilly cafeteria was filled with debaters from high schools across the Constitution State, many of them sweaty palmed, with their dress shirts and ties partly undone after two long rounds of intense debating. Two teams of two debaters were announced over a raspy microphone as having made it to the final round. One was from Hamden High School, the other from Wilton High. This was the 2006 Connecticut Debate Association State Finals.

Hamden’s qualification for the final round came as a surprise to the Hamden High Debate Team as a whole. The chosen Hamden debaters, senior Carl Anderson and I, junior Khalid Nourediene Lumendifi, were taken aback at once. Though our first debate went well, we felt like our last round had gone afoul, with a judge that did not seem to care for the topic at hand (the Resolution was "Bloggers should be protected by journalistic privilege and shield laws in the United States"). He seemed to be watching the rain fall outside more than the debate. His brow was constantly furrowed, visibly irritated by every one of our arguments. Our opponents, from the arch-rival Amity Debate Team, began that second battle strong. Towards the end Carl hit Amity’s star debater, Brandon Vossberg, with a number of zingers, and I concluded on a firmly crystalized note. Nevertheless, it stuck us and our lone spectator, junior Erika Moody, as if it could have gone either way.

Our team had not planned to stay for the entire tournament. We had planned to go home after the finalists were announced and we had given them our congratulations. All of us were tired, and were prepared for an evening of relaxation. I wasn’t even convinced that most of the debaters on our team wanted to say. It was so cloudy that the halls of the venue were lit in significance only by hideous florescent lights. The size of the mammoth that was Darien High made many of us, in the words of a fellow debater, "feel poor." It was, in a word, depressing.

Despite this, I will never forget the look of jubilation that over took our coach, Mrs. Canalori, when we qualified. Junior Eric Kirchner leapt from his seat and raised his arms in their air, shouting uncontrollably in the euphoria of victory. Our captains, seniors Jeff Lipton and Peter Yakolev showed unusual emotion in the moment.

When we arrived in the massive dark Darien High School auditorium, I remember having flashbacks of glorious days last year when Charlie Nathanson and Scott Hochberg (both class of `05) regularly brought home huge trophies after humiliating debaters from other teams on their own turf. At that time last year, those were my heroes. No Hamden High School debater can deny the legend of Charlie Nathanson. If one does a Google search for "Hamden" "High" and "Debate", most results turn up pages bearing Nathanson’s name somewhere within them. Now my partner and I were standing in that exalted place. It was time to stop thinking and to start arguing.

I never looked the Others in the eye. I probably should have, but I didn’t. I had never seen these Wilton debaters before. Were they new? Were they graduating? Were they home schooled? Who were they? Usually one knows their opponent at least somewhat, it is surprisingly easy to become familiar with thirty-four varsity teams of two. It’s rather unsettling when one actually encounters an unfamiliar pairing. But like I said, it was time to stop thinking and to start debating.

The one thing they surely were not was mediocre. These girls knew how to debate. Their definitions were weak though, and as the Negative, it was our right to challenge and reject them. We did. Their contentions were strong. So were ours. We fought the tit-for-tat fight with them through our speeches. The main disaccord between our two cases was over just who was a journalist. Journalistic privilege should only be applied to those with extensive training in journalistic writing and a degree in that profession, went their line of thinking. On the contrary, we remarked, many of the greatest journalists ever had no professional training or had not even completed high school, such as the late and great Peter Jennings. I gave the concluding speech, drawing a couple sets of hearty applause from the crowd. After gathering our things off of the stage, Carl and I made the usual debate formalities, shaking hands with our opponents and taking our seats in the audience to await the results.

At the end of every debate trophies are awarded to the top 10 debaters from four categories, novice and varsity, which are each broken into team awards and individual speaker awards. This means that if you are in the top two or five of the varsity list for individual or team speakers, which Carl and I were, you’ve got quite a bit of waiting to do. The whole process took about ten or fifteen minutes, including the applause after each name was called. Carl and I were awarded 1st place team. We won the final debate, we slew the dragon. I won 1st place individual speaker. Hamden won.

On our way to the stage to receive our double pillared gold trophies, I heard cheering at a level unprecedented at any of the tournaments I had attended previously. From the seats on high where the "Pop you collar" Amity debaters sat, to the cheap seats where nameless South Asian Muslim debaters told me that finally one of "us" Muslims had gotten to the top, to the center seats where we and the Wilton team congratulated each other, respect for Hamden made itself known. As depressing as the clouds may have been and chilly as the air may have been, Hamden had yet to bring home a double pillar in a long time. It was a time of grandeur and a time of pride. Hamden’s pride.

Abu Musab esh-Sharmute

I hate Islamists. You know the deal. But if you don't, it's at the end of every news article about Algeria: "Algeria's civil war between the military and Islamist militas began in 1992 after the military halted elections that the Islamist FIS was poised to win took over 150,000 lives . . . blah blah blah". That's why. Islamists come in many different forms though. Some are peaceful and practice a sort of social gospel. Others are irritable and beat women for not being covered. Others massacre entire villages. Still others advocate sectarianism and conflict between religious groups in countries that they have no origins in.

Abu Musab ez-Zarqawi is one of those who likes to do the latter.

He is one of the few people that I can honestly say I hate.

I watched a CNN news blurb about his most recent tape today at school in journalism class. He called for Sunnis in Iraq and elsewhere to rise up against Shias. He called on Sunnis to forget those who advocate the end of sectarianism.

He told Sunnis to "wake up, pay attention and prepare to confront the poisons of the Shiite snakes."

He went on

"There is no difference between Shiites of Iran and the Shiites in the rest of the Arab world either in Iraq, Lebanon. their beliefs are the same .. their hatred of Sunnis is the same," he said, adding, "The roots of Jews and the Shiites are the same."

I'm a Jew. Wow. I did not know this. Mr. ez-Zarqawi is appearently quite omniscient, knowing things about us Shia that even we do not know.

Ez-Zarqawi even hates Ahmadinejad. Because that stupid Shia won't make good on his promises after "screaming and calling for wiping Israel from the map," but taking no action to do so.

He seems to want nothing but endless violence and struggle. I don't see what else opposing the end of sectarianism and opposing those "calling for national unity," could do.

But then again, as much should be expected from a terrorist, a man whose group and its allies destroy beautiful mosques and kill women and children like cattle. Such words come with the trade.

I think it is strange though, that Mr. Ez-Zarqawi finds it possible to say that all the Shias, from Iran to Lebanon to Iraq to Malaysia or to Algeria are the same. We believe the same things? No more than do Sunnis. That's why Bashar al-Asad is an Alawite and I am an Ismaili (Sevener) and Ahmadinejad is a Twelver. I don't believe in all the Immams that the Twelvers do, and I don't think of Ali in the same way that Alawis do. There are other sects too. All have their own character and special beliefs. We are of all different ethnicities and races too. Persians are a lot different from Berbers or Lebanese Arabs. Pakistani Shias are often racially dissimilar to East African Shias. Just like Sunnis.

Mr. ez-Zarqawi seems to be one of those young Arab men who grew up in a sleepy desert town with little to do but read religious texts and who has moved to a foreign country to find something to do. Kill people. Why? Because they're Shia. Because they're that different.

What makes this message even worse, aside from its venomous rhetoric, is that many in the Arab world will take this as gospel. They will believe it. There are many that really are that sheep like. Especially where there are few or no Shias. These are attitudes typical of Eastern bigots. It is known that in the Gulf, many Sunnis hold beliefs similar to Mr. ez-Zarqawi's and knowingly and willfully discriminate against their Shia countrymen. Some would act on it, other would not. The governments in that neck of the woods encourage these sentiments. What will they do now? What if some of those young Saudis who are getting ready to go to Iraq decide that it would be better to get rid of the "filth" in their country by attacking Saudi Shias? What would the Saudi government do? Probably very little, if anything.

Don't kill Shias. They're good people. Haifa Wehbe is Shia. Even if you don't like her music (eh...), you can't deny that she is a babe. There must be something wrong with Mr. ez-Zarqawi if he hates Haifa Wehbe. As the other Nouri has said, such attitudes show "a futile brutality, depraved mentally and morally."

I'm no Sunni and I'm not the boss of anyone, but I have some advice for the Sunnis (and everyone else out there): Don't listen to ez-Zarqawi. Ignore him.

A post-Ottoman Convergence: Algeria and Turkey

Turkish PM Tayyip Erdoğan visited Algeria this past week. Meeting with Algerian National Assembly Speaker Amar Saadani on Monday, Erdoğan met with president Bouteflika on Tuesday. After their three hour meeting, the two leaders announced an accord of "friendship and cooperation." Erdoğan visited a veterans cemetery and the Algerian military museum, surveying artefacts from Algeria's Ottoman period and praising Algeria's veterans. ".....The heroes of the struggle for independence in Algeria are the best examples for today's generations," Erdoğan said. Erdoğan also made statements in relation to his county's desired assencion into the European Union, sating that “If the EU is to become a Christian club, it should announce this.”

The picture above is interesting. Here we have the tiny Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika (right) recieving the Turkish Prime Minister in a rather traditional manner, usually seen among leaders of Islamic and Middle Eastern states. Erdoğan, the leader of the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, one of Algeria's former colonial rulers, is greeted by Bouteflika as a member of the Haras Joumhouri, the Republican Cavalry looks on. We see the convergence of history here. On the one hand, we have the presidents of the Modern, Bouteflika and Erdoğan, as well as the Cavalryman. On the other we have a traditional greeting among men whose nations were at one time, at least ostensibly, one.

The Haras Joumhouri's purpose is to provide the Republic with a fashionable display of Algerian traditions to foreign dignitaries and on official occasions. Like many other cavalry units today, it is symbolic in nature. Wearing baggy green trousers ("serwal"), red shirts ("kamisa"), long white capes ("bernous") and tall white caps with the nation's coat of arms, the Haras Joumhouri is entirely the invention of the modern Algerian state, though created with the traditions of the pre-Republican era in mind. Its equestrian nature makes a call out to the Numidian and Bedouin cavalry of antiquity and the early Islamic period. Its stately presence calls back to the time of Islamic pomp and procedure when Algeria was a part of the Ottoman Empire. The colors of the Haras Joumhouri's uniform, like the Algerian flag it is modeled upon, shout back to the resistence of the Emir Abdel Qadir, that chivalrous Sufi who formed his own statelet in the aftermath of the French invasion until, or so the story goes, he was sold out by the Moroccan monarch, forced to surrender by the French, and exiled to Syria. Somewhat of a Muslim Jurgurtha, Abdel Qadir's tale has become one of the corner stones of Algerian nationalism, and his statelet is often held to be the beginning of the Algerian state in Algerian historiographies.

A picture of the Haras Joumhouri, one with saber, the other on horseback.

The photograph shows two nations, both now out of the Ottoman bind, coming together and building their futures in the image of the Modern. Erdoğan's nation is one of the few demoracies in this world that is populated by a vast majority of Muslims. Far from being perfect, Turkey has since the time of Ataturk associated itself strongly with Europe and made great progress in terms of modernization and secularization. Algeria is similar, yet quite different. While Algeria, like Turkey, has turned its back on its colonial past, it has not secularized the state in its entirety, as Turkey has, nor has it made the transition to a democracy. It has all the trappings of one, but without the substance that is carried by Turkey or any other (semi) democratic state. Turkey has tried to escape Islam. Algeria has, by and large, tried to rediscover it, relatively speaking. Though less Islamically inclined than the populations of many other Muslim countries, Algeria's state has been legitimized in the name of a collective Muslim identity. Turkey's has been formed on an ethnic one. The Algerian state does not make references to great "Algerian migrations" into what is now Algeria, like Turkey's does to the migrations of Turks into Anatolia. Algeria is a nation created in the fires of the Independence War; Turkey is one whose national identity has been fabricated in some places, and in other legitimized by race. The Algerian state and the Turkish state differ quite a lot in their workings and nature.

Nevertheless, these two leaders can come together and sign agreements of friendship and share a common history in an amiable setting. Turkey is a nation to be admired, as is Algeria. Both have made great achievements since they became independent. Algeria has overcome, for the most part, an Islamist scourge, and has gone from a mostly illiterate nation in 1962 to one of the most literate countries in Africa. From a collection of paupers to a nation of some of the most well off men and women on their continent. Turkey has gone from a semi-feudal medival empire to a modern, economically significant, secular, capitalist nation-state. Yet both nations must move out of backwardness in key areas: their own history and their dealings with minorities.

Algeria and Turkey both seem to have trouble in being honest with their youths about the history of their nations. Algeria's government rarely acknowledges the fact that Islam arrived in the region by force. Many inhabitants of what would become Algeria did convert willingly to Islam, but many, if not most, did not. This is a problem found in many Islamic countries. Few Algerian historians would fathom investigating the possibility of positive things happening as a result of French rule. Still other historians of the Berberist persuasion seek to do the same with the time period following the arrival of Arabs into Algeria. Turkish historians seem to not be capable of relating the truth about the "Turkification" of Anatolia from a predominantly Hellenistic region. I have read more than a few essays giving a simple, ahistorical, explanation for this: "The Turks have always dwelled in Turkey." On the issue of the Armenian genocide, it is hard to find a Turkish historian that deviates from the state line that it "never happened," or was not a genocide despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Both Algeria and Turkey have behaved abusively towards their national minorities, Berbers and Kurds, respectively and particularly. In Algeria, any time that Berbers have protested, peacefully or otherwise, for political and cultural equality they have been met with bitter and brutal force. In Turkey, as Kurds have agitated for autonomy, independence or any form of ethno-political representation they have been met with similar and often more hideous force, and quickly identified collectively with the extreme (nota bene: there are many Kurdish terrorist groups, but are certainly not representative of the mentality or nature of the entire Kurdish population).

Turkey and Algeria's new accord has much, I believe, to do with Bouteflika's recent anti-French rhetoric. Turkey has declared the French colonization of the country to have been a genocide, and France's idea of criminalizing denial of the Armenian genocide in response. It does not hurt that Turkey is one of Algeria's biggest trading partners either.

As strikes have forced the Algerian government to regroup, it will be interesting to see how the new Prime Minister of Algeria, Abdel-Aziz Belkhadem, will deal with Algeria's history and minorities, as well as economic matters. Mr. Belkhadem, who has been described by El Watan as having "little experience" with economic affairs, is perhaps no better suited to deal with the Berber problem than was his predecessor. But let us hope for the best and that Mr. Belkhadem can start up the same amount of progress in the area of ethnic relations, housing and wages that Algeria has made in literacy and modernization and that Turkey has made in the economic field and secularization.

On Arab-Americans and Darfur

The Arab American Institute has revamped its website, and it looks great. The previous layout was rather lame, this one is modern looking and easy to use. Check it out, and take this quiz on Arab-Americans. I got 14 out of 14 correct, try your luck. It isn't hard, but should be informative if you don't know too much about the population.

The AAIUSA website is a great resource to learn about Arab-Americans. It has its biases, but it is also a treasure trove of information on what Arab-Americans, Democrat, Republican, and independent are up to. For instance, I had no idea that James Zogby, the AAI's president, spoke at the "Save Darfur" rally recently. I hadn't heard anything about this at all. I was under the impression that Arab-American group had sort of put their heads down on that issue and just ignored it. But Dr. Zogby went out and took it on head on. It's amazing to see what little attention Arab-American get from their country's media. It seemed as if it was a big deal that Jewish and black groups and stars were protesting the Darfur issue, while Arab-American condemnation of the violence was ignored in toto. I mean, even though there were probably fewer Arabs at the protest (I've heard from friends, Jews in fact, that they thought the protest was about 75% Jewish and maybe 15% black, and the rest generic white people), I think the fact that one of the major leaders in the Arab-American community came out and spoke against it is something worth mentioning. Isn't it Arabs that are in Sudan doing the bulk of the killing and "ethnic cleansing"? I'm always hearing Americans (whites, blacks, Jews, etc.) telling me that Arabs should look at their history and world objectively (something I totally agree with, as you can see here and elsewhere), yet when Arabs actually do this, these same people are indignant, un-informed, or don't pay attention. Checking out the AAI website once in a while would do these sorts of people some good.

Dr. Zogby's remarks afterwards are quite moving.

With no other Arab speaker on the program, I understood what might be interpreted either by my absence or my presence at the rally. After consultations with several Arab friends and a number of experts on African affairs, I resolved to participate.

It was important that Arab Americans make clear our deep concern with the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Our presence in this multi-ethnic multi-religious coalition sends this message.

Where were the Arabs? I sometime joke that Arabists ask this question whenever they get themselves into trouble. But I think this is a valid question on matter of Darfur. I don't believe in making collective apologies for the actions of others who behave like uncivilized miscreants, and I am not going to advocate doing so here or ever. But Arabs have made their entire region, people and culture look like the scum at the bottom of a coffee pot by ignoring the plight of the people in Darfur --not just the non-Arabs there but also of the Arab civilians killed by non-Arab militias.

People have noticed. Last summer I attended a youth conference on diplomacy that took me to three Western European countries with a host of American youths from all over the United States. The contingent was overwhelmingly white, though there were four or five Arabs (all from Virginia, or New Jersey, with the exception being myself from Connecticut), a Persian (from LA), and perhaps two or three American blacks, each from different states.

At this conference we participated in a United Nations simulation. The couple of hundred odd mass of youths was divided into the various organs and committees of the UN. I was given China's seat on the UN Security Council, which was tasked with dealing with the genocide in Darfur. Before each meeting we were given briefings on debate procedure and resolution writing, as well as the background of the issue we were covering and our countries' backgrounds.

Obviously, it would not be in China's interest to have a resolution passed in the SC that would allow for the oil flow to be disrupted, discontinued, or modified negatively. This meant that I was supposed to oppose military intervention and economic sanctions.

Following my orders from the briefing I opposed the resolutions put forward by the US, the Romanian and French delegates that would have put troops on the ground or put huge punative sanctions on Sudan. I did my best to prolong debate on the definition of "genocide," why sovereignity was good and why the UN had no right to tell Sudan how to handle its internal affairs. Standard Third World regime preservation talk. I banded together the Russian and Algerian delegates, together with the African/Third World representatives and made my own resolution that merely condemned the violence without actually calling for any sort of action. This reslution did not pass (it was vetoed by, I believe, either France or the US). The final resolution we worked on was sponsored by the US, France, and all the "do gooder" states on the SC. It had overwhelming support verbally from most delegates. I gave a lengthy speech voicing China's commitment to peace and security, without actually embracing the resolution.

When it was time to vote, the placards went up around the table in favor. Algeria's voted no. Russia abstained. Some small African state's abstained. I asked the moderator to come back to me after going around the council. A few others voted nay. The vast majority voted "yes," including all the major heavy weights. I voted "no". It was dead.

After being consoled by the moderator (the French delegate cried at how "unfair" it all was to the people of Darfur), we begane to discuss our own views of the conflict. I kept quiet for a little while, before the delegate from Benin addressed me directly.

"You're racist," she said. She was black from Missuri.

"What?" I was confused.

"You Arabs hate Africans, you make slaves of them, rape them, commit genocide, and look how you voted on the resolution just now!"

I wanted to explain to her that I was not voting based on my opinion, I was voting on how I thought China would react to it. She should have known that. But she did not seem to. I instead told her something less acedemic.

"I enslave African people?" I inquired.

"Not you, but Arabs like you do. Just like white people enslaved us back when!" She shouted.

"I am African," I said, sort of half laughing. "I'm Berber, native African. Algeria is in Africa. Don't yell at me over that, shout at Saddam or Yemna about that," Yemna was one of the other Arabs at the conference, she was Yemeni.

"You're not African! You're Arab!" I'm thinking, WHAT?? "Arabs are doing to people in Darfur what they always have done to us!"

"Who is 'us'?" I asked her.

"Africans, all over the world" at this point I was thoroughly irritated. There is nothing that I can stand less than pan-ethnic or racial nationalism. Her reasoning stunk of Négritude. Remember that stuff that Marcus Garvey and Leon Damas used to talk about? That's what Négritude is. It's like black pan-Arabism, only it makes less sense because it bases membership in the grand African nation on skin color. Not to mention that it was started and propogated largely by blacks from the Americas who did not speak African languages, follow African religions, belong to African ethnic groups, or have famlies in or live in Africa. It was totally romantic and nonsensical in every way. It vilified white people and Arabs (to a lesser extent, more so nowadays) as evil slave traders whose civilizations were inferior and detrimental to African life in ever way they could be. How do you reason with a romantic? I might as well have been trying to explain to Michel Aflaq or Sati al-Husri why Berbers and Kurds are not Arabs.

"You're not African," I said. The other kids went silent. "I'm more African than you. I think in Berber. I speak it. I have family living in Africa, and that fought for liberation from colonialism. I have citizenship in the African Union. What do you think you're doing telling me I'm a slave trader?"

"You're not African," she said again. "You're Arab."

"Sure, I'm Arab. And you're English. Being conquered by an Arab doesn't make you Arab."

She had no idea what I meant. I was just a swarthy Arab of uncertain origins to her.

"I'm African because I'm black," she blabbered. "You're not because you aren't black. It's simple, your people didn't come from Africa."

"My people sure as hell did come from Africa. Where do you get off being African because you're black? Is George Bush European because he's white? No, he's American, like I'm African and you're American."

She was mad. "You're only African because you people killed all the black people," this makes sense, huh?

"No, I'm African because my passport is Algerian, my family is from Africa and Berbers are African, not Arab," I told her.

"That's not African. That's white."

I asked the French delegate, "Am I white? She says I am white. How white am I to you?"

She said "You don't look white...no" I made my point.

Benin persisted. "So what, you're not black."

"So I'm African. Are you American?"

"Yes."

"So you're not African. You're American."

"African-American."

"You cannot say you are American and then say you are African like it is your country," I told her.

"I'm African first."

"Have you been to Africa? Where is your citizenship? Where does you family say they are from?"

"No I have not and I'm American and my family is from Missuri, so what?!"

"So you're American. You are black from America. There is nothing African about you other than that somebody in your family some time came from Africa to America. That does not mean you get to tell African people that they are slavers and not from Africa. How can you be African without having been there?!"

"You're not African," she said again. "You're Arab."

"I am not Arab, and my people say the same thing of Arabs because they conquered us. Other African people say this about other people too, Africans in South Africa say it about Zulus, Tutsis about Hutus, everybody hates some body in Africa for things Africans do to Africans. It is not so simplistic. Only a non-African would think in black and white like that."

"Whatever, you Arabs are the new white people in Africa," she groweled. "That's why they don't help black people."

"So is Mugabe and the Hutu and Ibo. Black people aren't the only Africans and they aren't the only victims."

"They are in Sudan," she fired back.

"No, black people kill Arabs there in the villages and camps. You cannot be serious."

"There are never Arabs in the camps on TV," Arab Sudanese are black as night often times. I've never met a Sudanese Arab that was lighter than me, and I'm pretty dark by North African standards. I don't think it'd be so easy to pick out an Arab in one of those camps by looking at them.

She was smart. She had obviously opened a few books before, which was why I actually engaged her instead of talking off or ignoring her. I had to wonder what kind of books she had read though.

My point with this anecdote is not that black people are not African or anything to that effect. Rather it is to show that Arab indifference, and silence has had a negative impact on how Arabs and those ruled by Arabs are viewed in the world. This is just one example of how I have seen black people turn against Arabs as "the new White Man," even thought most of the slaves in North Africa were white, and many Arabs are Africans and fought the same enemies as Africans south of the Sahara.

I am really glad that Dr. Zogby spoke at the rally. I wish more Arabs would show that they care about humanity. Arab-Americans are largely invisible when it comes to national politics, especially on issues that effect them, with weak leadership that is largely accountable more to large polical parties (Democrats, Republicans) than to Arab-Americans or to themselves as individuals. So Arab-Americans are pretty much politically irrelevant compared to other minorities like blacks, Jews, and even Chinese or Japanese Americans, despite the fact that many hold appointed and elected positions throughout the nation. Even with the existance of the American Arab anti-Discrimination Committee (founded by former US senator James Abourezk) and the AAI, negative perseptions of Arabs persist, and little is done to effectively combat this. Arab-Americans must take a greater stand on issues like Darfur, and make it known that they are not the US's branch of the janjaweed (as the girl mentioned early asserted later in our conversation).

Check out AAI, and the ADC website, and if you are an Arab-American, let people know that you do not condone heathen like behavior anywhere, even if they are Arabs, Muslims, Maronites, whatever. It is imperative. Not that "Arabs" don't, but that you don't, apologizing for the group is insincere, clarifying your own position is.

Nouri Our State CHAMP

If you were wondering what our little Nouri has been up to lately, go check him out and don't forget to congratulate him.

http://wahdah.blogspot.com/2006/05/hello.html#links

"I am now the Connecticut state champion for debate..."

YAY^5!  (:

Algerian money putting food on Palestinian plates

Algeria handed over $35 million to the Palestinian Authority. I don't know that I've heard of such a massive waste of money since they came out with that whole "pay as you go" cell phone system. The West has refused to keep throwing money at the PA. And because Palestine is oh so important, the Arabs must come to its aid. Yes, so important is Palestine in fact that the Algerian government needs to throw away money there while Algerians can hardly find proper housing or jobs. $35 million. Why not put that towards building these new housing units Boutef promised? Or improving the roads or communications? Why does Palestine require all of this money? Other people's money. Not even Palestinian money, but Algerian, Saudi, and Emirati money. Why are Algerians paying Palestinian salaries? What have Palestinians ever done for Algeria? Nothing. What have they done in any Arab state but suck up money and resources, and cause chaos and trouble? Nothing. Why are Arabs putting up with them? Their conflict has caused more trouble than their little strip of land is worth. Honestly. Why are people so backward? Why do they refuse to move forward? Why don't they take responsibility for their own actions and countries? Why do they send thier children to die before they have finished puberty? I do not understand.

The over arching question I have though is this: why do poor Arab countries foot the bill for the Palestinians? I believe this should be reserved for the wealthy Arabs in the Gulf and such areas, rather than the ones who live in squalor and are still "catching up". Why should Algerians, Egyptians or Jordanians have resources diverted from their countries to serve Palestinians? I can actually see this for Jordanians (are there any of them left?), perhaps Egyptians, but for Algerians or others, no. We are too far removed from them; their battle is not ours. It has never been. Algeria should focus on improving itself before pumping its money into a failed system that supports behavior Algerians would never tolorate in their own country. It is well known that in many Arab states, few people genuinely want to aid the Palestinians, given the fact that few of them actually pay what they promise to the PA. Talking to Lebanese, Syrians or "native" Jordanians, one often gets the feeling that only Arabs who do not have to deal with the Palestinians on a daily basis really want to be more Palestinian than the Palestinians. These feelings are totally irrational. Leave the Palestinians and the Israelis to those who made the mess in the first place, not "the Arabs" as many often believe, but to the Syrians, Palestinians and others in the immediate region who started the mess in the first place. The costs are not worth the potential benefits to continue with this nonsense from the Maghrib. This does not come out of hatred for Palestinans, but rather out of concern for national and regional priorities. Quite frankly, it is more beneficial to a North African state to have good inter-national relations with Israel than with the PA. This goes economically, diplomatically and socially. Trade with Israel, a developed, modern democracy, is more beneficial than trade with depressed Palestine. There is a wider selection of goods in Israel than in Palestine. Recognition or at least the maintainance of an amicable relationship on a non-recognized basis (similar to that of Tunisia) will result in better relations with the West and open more doors for Algeria in the international arena. Not to mention that new weaponry will be available for sale to Algeria because of this; modern Western weaponry at that. Israel sells American made and/or designed weapons to China of all countries, as well as India. Certainly if Algeria were to recogize her, she would open this avenue to the North African state. Further, many Algerians in the diaspora are of Jewish lineage and fear returning to Algeria because of anti-Jewish/Israeli sentiments in some parts of the population. This would allow our Jewish country men to relax and would promote a healthy relationship between Muslim Algerians and Jewish Algerians. The current situation is not healthy.

But I digress.

Bottom line is this. Foreign aid is not bad, and aiding those who truely need help is not either. But blowing millions of dollars on a failed "state" apparatus while postponing/delaying/never completing projects for internal development at home is wrong. It should not be happening, not in Algeria, not anywhere. Algerians do not have money to waste that way. Qatris, Saudis, Kuwaitis may, but Algerians could use some aid as well. Palestinians are not the only Arabs in need. I will be waiting to see what Algeria gets out of this. (My guess is absolutely, positively nothing.)

Nouri's Note: Let me be very clear so that there is no misunderstanding:
1) I am not a Zionist; but I am not an Arabist. Jew, Arabs, get over yourselves. Take what you've got and make the best of it.

2) I do not hate Palestinians. I just don't want to have to pay for them at my own expense when Algerians are in as much need (minus the military occupation; actually on second thought...)

3) Palestine/Israel is not something I particularly care about and I believe that they suck up attention from more pressing matters in the ME/NA, and, as a result, have led many Westerners and Arabs alike to believe that all problems there stem from this one conflict. No, they stem from autocratic egos and silly ideologies.

4) I don't think Arabs "care" about this junk. Again, there are more pressing matters at hand than a little strip of desert by the sea. If it came down to providing housing, education, general welfare, and prosperity to Algeria, Lebanon, Egypt, where ever and liberating Palestine, I think most Arabs would chose liberating their own homelands through the stuff I mentioned before first.

5) Palestinians are nice folks, they just need to stop pretending as if the Arab world ought to revolve around them.

On the Improbability of an Atajazairi

I have previously provided to the reader two quotations from that infamous Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Both of these present his views on religion and civilization, respectively. These have cause me to ponder the following question: Can there, could there, ever be an Algerian Ataturk? I do not believe so.

Firstly, I believe that the situation in Algeria today, as it always has been, is fundamentally from that of Turkey. Turkey differ from Algeria mainly in that it can claim an ethnicity that is separate from Islam entirely. There would be Turks without Islam. However, it is debatable as to whether or not there would be Algerian Arabs with out Islam. Furthermore, much credit is usually given to the role of Islam in the formation of the Algerian national identity and culture. This is not to say that Algeria is exclusively Arab, however, the vast majority of Algerians identify themselves as ethnic Arabs rather than Berbers or other ethnicities. Ataturk’s success in Turkey was his ability to separate the nation from religion and its burdens. Religion and nationalism were made two totally different concepts. Religion was made private, and excluded entirely from the public square. This approach would never hold water in Algeria. To many Algerians, Islam is nationalism and nationalism is Islam. It was a rebellious act, as the nation was forming under the French boot, for a woman to wear the veil, or to fervently shout Islamic phrases. It was never rebellious for Turkish women to wear the veil; it was always a conservative measure and a marker of backwardness, part of the grand superstition that was Islam. Though Turks were and remain very Muslim, being Muslim has never been a prerequisite for being Turkish. Algeria’s religious and political experience are fundamentally different from Turkey’s. The man who can separate Islam from the Algerian nation will be nothing short of a genius, for this task will be extremely difficult.

This may cause the reader to ask the question Has not the Civil War cause Algerians to become more secular? The answer is yes. But Algerians, as Turks, remain Muslims, for the most part. Even among the most rational of Algerians one can find those who are able to quote the Qur’an off the top of their heads or are at least somewhat practicing Muslims. Very few Algerian politicians have the gall to proclaim to their nation that they have no religion as Ataturk did to his. There are some Algerians who sympathize with Ataturk’s social positions regarding women and the like, but very few adhere to his religious views. Islam has almost always been a unifying force in Algeria at the national level in some way or another, with a few exceptions (notably with ethnic relations between Arabs and Kabyles). Algerians would, for the most part, not accept the abolition of Islam as the state religion as an edict. This would cause conflict not only at the rhetorical level, but also at the armed level. The results of such measures were seen during the Civil War of 1992-1999.

Boutef So Far

Here is a set of lists of what I believe to be the three best political and economic decisions/reforms, and the three worst of both, in Algeria since President Bouteflika came to power in 1999 (so far).

Top Three Political Decisions
1) The declaration by president Bouteflika that the "era of revolutionary legitimacy" is over (in a speech to the Congress of War Veterans on December 1, 2004). Though somewhat abstract, this has numerous potential benefits. Firstly, it emphasizes official support for meritocracy in government. Since independence, most government jobs have been allocated on the basis of two things; 1) an individual's connections to and/or participation in the Revolution of November 1 (Was he/she a mujahadid? Was their husband? Was their father? etc.) and 2) how willing the state was to expand its bureaucracy for the sake of creating jobs. This was unsaid but widely understood by most. If one looks at most of the government ministers and those who were given managerial positions in government corporations, it is clear that the mujahadine were well placed and taken care of. They were given other privileges that ordinary Algerians were not, for example, they were allowed to import new cars and other luxuries that non-mujahadine could only dream of. This situation was perpetuated by the state and allegations of the corruption that it caused were muffled. Now, there is at least official support for merit based appointments and nominations, not simply who was in whose brigade during what stage of the Revolution.

That situation also left the younger people (who were too young to have participated in the Revolution) out of the game, as older people were placed on high and created a road block to progress (for the youth). Bouteflika's declaration that this period is over is not just philosophical (in the sense that now the Revolution has ended and we can now get on with our lives), but it also ushers in the new generation of Algerians born in post-Revolutionary Algeria who must be brought into the life of their country. It is similar to John F. Kennedy's speech where he declared that it was the time for a new generation of Americans, "born in this century" to lead their nation forward (he was of course talking about the twentieth-century).

It also debases the Islamist claims to power. One of the main reasons that the FIS believed itself to be more fit to run Algeria than the FLN was that it supposedly had a more "authentic" vision of the Revolution, rooted in Islam. Abbasi Madani was a revolutionary, as were numerous other FIS chiefs. Since the FLN had always ruled because "the Revolution willed it," if a challenger rose he would have to show that his legitimacy was superior in Revolutionary terms. The state's reason for being was the Revolution not 10 years ago, and if the FIS had their way it would have been Islam that justified the state's existence. However, Bouteflika's declaration made the will of the Algerian people the state's reason for being and, consequently, did two other things. First was that he established a social contract for Algerians which previously did not really exist, outside of a few circles (the state was not in the people's service, it was in the Revolution's service). Second was that he essentially gave his support to a pluralistic Algeria, because if Algeria operated on a system of Revolutionary legitimacy only the FLN would be able to rule, and the one party state would be justified.

Another thing that this did was that it de-emphasized the military's claims to a right to meddle in government and civilian affairs. For many years, most of Algeria's independent history as a matter of fact, the military ruled by default and forced its will on the legislature and people. Only one Algerian president has been a civilian thus far (Bouteflika, though he came into power with the military's backing), and the reason for this has mostly been that the military secured Algerian independence and thus knows best how to safeguard the Revolution (i.e. the state and all that is related to it) from a "deviant path." This basically delegitimizes a military dictatorship. (Also here, I would add the fact that he sacked many of the military hardliners that had backed his bid for the presidency, like Mohammed Lamari, former head of the Army retired and the new Army head, Salah Gaïd, all of whose top choices for his own replacement as head of the Land Forces were forced to retire and many of the military commanders for the major military districts were rearranged. Lamari was a major éradicator during the Civil War while Gaïd is considered to be mostly apolitical in this sense. The hardliners that had put Boutef in office have mostly become sideliners.)

Lastly, since the government had operated for many years on a "Revolutionary" basis, it took socialism to be a matter of doctrine. Socialism was part of the Revolution's platform (especially that of the FLN) and was declared to be the rule of the state in the Constitution until all references to socialism and the FLN were removed from the Constitution in the 1980's and 1990's. By declaring that the Revolution is no longer the source of the state's legitimacy, Bouteflika has basically said that Algeria can experiment with different economic philosophies.

2) The rebuilding of Algeria's international prestige and the creation of new partnerships and alliances abroad. Bouteflika has rebuilt Algerian relations with Africa, the Arab world, Asia, Iran, the United States, Europe and other countries by reaching out and making smart diplomatic moves. Seeing as he was the Algerian Foreign Minister under Boumediene, it is only logically that he would excel at this task. Since Bouteflika has been president and ended the major parts of the Islamist conflict, Algeria has held the presidency of the African Union, the Arab League and has made many diplomatic breakthroughs, bringing Algeria back as a world leader in African and Southern geo-politics. Algeria has been able to become associated with NATO in the Mediterranean (strengthening the Navy), and participated in US efforts to fight terrorism in the Sahel, while at the same time maintaining its old friendships with countries like Russia, Romania, the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. He has taken a truely "Third World" approach to foreign policy, not affiliating himself with radical regimes or becoming a client regime. His pragmatic approach is really in Algeria's best interest. Not to mention that it has encouraged investment and aid from Japan, the US, Belgium (the first international franchise in Algeria recently opened, a Belgian fast-food chain called "Quick"), and even Iran. His foreign policy has allowed Algeria to break free from the confines of traditional Arab foreign policy, which is seldom independent (usually Arab states act as clients to a foreign Western or regional power, for instance the way Syria is subordinate to Iran or Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf to the United States, or the way Syria, Egypt and Algeria were once subordinate to the USSR, as were many "Third World" states).

3) The first amnesty. The first Bouteflika amnesty ended the Algerian Civil War which is very commendable. Attacks have decreased and life has gotten easier and back to "normal" for the most part. Reconciliation is a wonderful idea, and it allows for progress to be made in the improvement of everyday life. The first amnesty was great; the second not so great. The second one just pardoned criminals and didn't really establish any basis for healing or justice. It let's the security forces off scott free, the Islamist militants, about 2,000, off scott free, and does not force them to make amends. I would have prefered a more South African or Norther Ireland sort of reconciliation, rather than this fake reconciliation.

Top Three Economic Decisions
1) Ending the state monopoly on the energy industry (SONATRACH). SONATRACH was huge, largely inefficient and corrupt. Sure, it provided jobs, but it didn't perform as well as it should have. Opening up the industry to competition will allow for more growth, though I would prefer some regulation to see that Algerian benefit from the gas.

2) The proposed privitization of about 1300 state owned industries. Again, this breaks of state monopolies on drugs, agriculture, health services, construction and the like. This will make more competition and hopefully, more innovation and progress in the economy. Already about 130 have been bought by Algerians and foreigners alike and more are being sold off as I write this. This is important to Algeria's structural reform because it takes apart the old statist/socialist system that for some many years refused to work.

3) The general reform minded condition that has attracted foreign investors and banks to Algeria. A new airport in Algiers is being built and the first ever metro in Algiers is due to open soon. In addition, there are other transportation related projects underway which is wonderful, and more and more foreigners are training Algerians and establishing offices there.

The Three Worst Political and Economic Decisions
1) The second amnesty, for reasons mentioned above.

2) The slow pace of privitization and general reform. A lot of the promises, for instance the creation of new housing units, have not been met and the government has not been able to effectively deal with urban decay and has refused to seriously take on the matter. This has caused riots and unrest in many quarters.

3) The poor handling of dissent. Firstly in 2001 there was the uprising in Kabylia, mostly of neglect and a lack of housing units. The revolt was viewed by many foreigners (especially in France and on the BBC) as being "cultural" in nature, with the Kabyles rising up for language recognition. This was also the perception in much of Algeria. This was not so much the case however as most of the rioters expressed no phiolosophy or ethnic montra and were mainly rioting because they had no legal means of expressing themselves (that would be heard at least) and their frustration with poverty and the impunity of the police. The riots started after a young man named Massinisa Guermah was killed in police custody. The protests soon became protests over the lack of jobs, food and housing in the region. What was the government's response? Brute force, just like in 1963, just like in 1980, just like in 1988. Bouteflika would not (or could not) break from the cycle of state violence against Algerian citizens for whatever reason. This has just further alienated many in Kabylia and has not helped to bring the country together. In addition to this, the legislature passed laws that make it illegal to criticize the president, the military and law makers, in vague language. This makes it very easy for journalists to be locked up and held without cause, for printing offensive articles or cartoons (as we recently saw).

My Internet Fatwa

Saudi clerics have just issued a fatwa prohibiting women from freely using the internet.

Religious scholars have issued a fatwa prohibiting women from using the Internet without the presence of a mahram (a close relative they are prohibited to marry). This was followed by a call from Saudi businessmen to sue Web sites that call for freedom of thought and secularism, such as the aforementioned Web sites. (Hat tip: Sandmonkey and Silly Bahraini Girl)

I find this to be not just ridiculous, but retarded. So, I have decided that I will issue a fatwa of my own.

Cheikh Nourediene bin Khalid esh-Shirazi al-Lumendifi's Fatwa on Women and the Internet

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful, it is such that the woman may browse the internet, using any device, connection speed, browser, or other such thing that she desires. She may visit whatever websites, online boutiques, webforums, or what not that the man does. The woman does not need mahram for any of these activities and since women are among the most prudent of all of God's creations, it is obvious that she will be able to tell when she is coming into stormy seas, just as the man can. In all matters pertaining to the pursuit of knowledge, culture and pleasure the woman is entirely equal to the man. It is the duty of all Muslims to defend the rights of the woman and man.

Spread it around. :)